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Whenever a distinguished scholar prescribes a new scholarly en-
deavor, we must imagine it as practiced not by him alone but by
the academic multitudes and thus in its most vulgarized form. What
follows is unashamedly worst-case analysis, but-present precincts ex-
cepted of course-the worst case is often enough the real case. It may
be particularly unfair to subject Professor Stone's paper to this sort
of analysis, in part because his own past work is in such excellent
contrast to the tendencies I am about to denounce and in part be-
cause he himself sees the dangers and repeatedly warns against them.
Against such considerations, however, must be counterbalanced the
finding of so many of the participants in this symposium that, no
matter what the signals offered by the intellectual leadership, the
bulk of legal scholarship continues to focus on routine doctrinal anal-
ysis. Perhaps a handful of particularly subtle minds will be able to
practice the sensitivity to language for which Professor Stone calls
without falling into arid self-contemplation, but I am more concerned
with the place his paper will take in the overall movement of aca-
demic legal writing.
Professor Stone's call for "law as a language" may well be the first
trumpet call of an essentially reactionary movement in legal scholar-
ship, a retreat into the bowels of law from the various law and move-
ments. Lawyers see the stream of law and sociology, law and politics,
law and economics, law and psychology as fragmenting their schol-
arly core and corps. They do not want to bother mastering one and
after another. They may not see great payoffs in the past ands. Here
they are wrong, but the payoffs often have not been as great as the
pioneering zealots have promised. In some instances, such as law
and politics, the internalization of the and has been so great that the
legal scholars have almost forgotten that it was an alien force they
were absorbing.'
t Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley.
1. Compare Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersec-
tions between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169 (1968) (treating political
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The great monument to this resistance to law and is the continuity
of structure and staffing of the American law school. Of course, the
avant garde of the academy make a great to-do about the scatter of
curriculum innovations and the dusting of social science faculty mem-
bers. The contrast with medical schools, however, remains striking.
Medical schools require their students to enter with extensive under-
graduate preparation in the sciences on which medicine depends and,
in spite of the ideological inroads of the 70s, cram two more years
of science into them before doing much about medicine itself. The
law schools still require nothing of their entrants and still teach them
nothing but law, albeit law with an occasional incursion of some-
thing else.
Over and above the context of fatigue and stasis in which it is
offered, the prescription of law as language may turn out to be re-
actionary in a far more fundamental sense. It has always been easier
to deal with law as a closed system of concepts than as a real world
set of behaviors. All the law and movements seek to treat law as a
combination of the two. The law as language movement on the other
hand is to be seen as a means of abstracting from the world as it
exists. It is an assertion that the proper study of legal scholars is that
most internal part of the law itself, the language of the law, a lan-
guage seen as separate and peculiar, and one in which the scholar's
task is to polish up the concepts and vocabulary until the language
seems beautiful to the native speakers.
The laws as language approach may mask its retreat to formalism
by appearing itself to be the latest of the law and movements, law
and language, and thus also to be looking outward as well as inward.
The turn toward language, however, moves law to precisely that area
where the most subtle and slippery relation exists between concep-
tualization and the study of behavior. For the study of language can
either be the study of language behavior-how specified speaker X
communicates with specified listener Y-or it can be the study of how
"we" speak. Once real speech of real speakers to real listeners is trans-
formed into abstracted speech of universal speakers to universal audi-
ences, the study of language turns into the clarification of words and
concepts in the abstract or in prototypic contexts. Once law and 1an-
science as subject independent of law) with J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRusr (1980)
(analyzing judicial review from perspective combining law and political science), Schuck,
The Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 89 YALE L.J. 27
(1979) (examining nondiscrimination statute from same perspective), Stewart, The Refor-
mation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667 (1975) (analyzing admin-
istrative law developments from same perspective).
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guage begins to deal with what "we lawyers" say, it will easily slip
down the slope into treating law as an independent, closed conceptual
system. Law as language is aimed principally at reasserting the au-
tonomy of law-at returning law to lawyers by claiming that law is a
specialized language that only lawyers can speak. It is indicative that
Stone turns to musical notation and mathematics, esoteric languages
that allow their masters to claim that others cannot understand, let
alone contribute to, their disciplines.
The suspicion that Stone is in reactionary retreat rather than ad-
vancing in new directions is heightened by the tone of Section VI.
2
Law is to examine its own navel carefully to see how its use of words
varies-but only a bit and only subtly-from common English. In
the process it will achieve waivering conclusions comparable to those
in ethics and aesthetics. Law, aesthetics, and ethics are to exploit "the
mutuality of our ignorance" to search out common "fundamental
principles." Is this more than a prologue to yet another round in
the endless search for the holy grail of neutral principles or rea-
soned elaboration or the law working itself clear? In lesser hands than
Stone's, won't all this be a return to the jurisprudence of concepts?
Will legal aesthetics be any different from the old German "legal
science" except for allowing the ideological preferences behind the
wordplay to show more clearly?
Is Professor Stone's paper a retreat to formalism followed by the
promise that formalism can be just as good a tool for a new social
democratic ideology as it was for the old liberal democratic ideology?
I believe that there is a way of turning the law as language move-
ment in a better direction. As I have just suggested, to begin with
the question "what do we lawyers mean when we say 'the average
reasonable man'?" is to court disaster: a barren exercise in analytic
philosophy, Perelmanian rhetoric, or 1940s semantics that will lead
only to the insight that lawyers don't talk exactly as other people and
on the other hand they don't talk so differently either. If we begin
instead by asking why a lawyer occupying a specific position (plain-
tiff's tort lawyer, trial judge, insurance company claims adjuster) uses
the term "average reasonable man" when speaking to a specific audi-
ence (individual lay client, opposing counsel, judge, corporate cli-
ent's in-house counsel, jury) in a particular setting (office conversa-
tion, appellate brief, letter stating claim, letter threatening suit, law
review article), then law-as-language studies may help us to gain new
2. Stone, From a Language Perspective, 90 YALE L.J. 1149, 1168-73 (1981).
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insights about the real world and insights that allow us to describe
the real world more precisely. I believe that it is far more possible
to describe the real world precisely than to describe legal language
precisely, if we mean by legal language some general linguistic sys-
tem. It is far easier to describe legal language in a new but vague
way, however, than it is to describe the real world precisely. That
is the pitfall in the Stone approach: its most probable consequence
is the easy way out-more law jaw-jaw-rather than the harder but
more useful way out-specific description of actual language behavior.
In short, I believe that law should not now make a last start down
the high road of modem linguistic philosophy-which is probably
not going anywhere anyway-but ought to start down the low road
of pragmatics or semiotics or communications theory, or whatever
you want to call the study of language in specific context. This con-
text has (1) a specific pre-existing situation, (2) a specific sender, (3)
a specific transmission medium, (4) a specific receiver, (5) a specific
change in the pre-existing situation subsequent to the transmission.
The low road would quickly lead us to (1) a new perspective, (2) a
new body of data, and (3) new analytical tools.
(1) We have both deliberately and unconsciously treated law talk
as the talk of judges to other judges and to lawyers contemplating
future litigation (case method, stare decisis). But the two principal
talks of lawyers are lawyer to client (counseling) and lawyer to lawyer
(negotiating). We have assumed without empirical investigation that
these two talks are so heavily determined by judge to judge and
judge to lawyer talk that we may study the case law tail rather than
the counseling and negotiating dog. What if we began our study of
law with the proposition that law is not what judges say in the re-
ports but what lawyers say-to one another and to clients-in their
offices?
(2) What if our data were not the reports but office files?
(3) What if our tool was the historical reconstruction of the flow
of talk rather than Lexis?
Such an approach would give us a more accurate description of
law as it is. Would it do more: would it give us a tool for making
law "better" in some sense? Yes, because it would allow us to spot
failures of communications and so lead to the improvement of com-
munications technique. More important, it would allow us to see where
legal conflict or misunderstanding was a result of inadequate com-
munication and where it was a result of differing purposes in different
categories of senders and receivers.
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My disagreements with (or perhaps only differences of emphasis
from) Stone can be seen in the following diagramatic pastiche which,
for the sake of completeness, also charts a middle road about which
I know too little to comment. The difficulty with talking about law
as language or even law and language is that it lumps together all
the various paths so roughly sketched here. I accuse Professor Stone
first of trying to reestablish the autonomy of legal discourse-law as
its own language rather than law and everybody's language-and second
of taking the high road on my sketch map while I take the low.
law and
ethics
































law and ethnomethodology -
There are hints that Stone might be willing to head down the com-
munications theory and ethno-methodology paths. His concentric cir-
cle image3 appears to me ambivalent, on the one hand implicating
practical and specific language behavior in the realm of legal schol-
arship, on the other reserving the central place of honor for abstract
law-language analysis. If, however, he is in fact urging law and phi-
losophy, then, as he himself repeatedly suggests, he is choosing an
uncertain way. Ordinary language philosophy is already chasing its
own tail. As to the new ethics, the lawyer's wish is father to the
belief that it will get very far. The building of a post-consequentialist
ethics is still at a rudimentary and confused stage, 4 and, as a number
of the contributors to this symposium argue, such an ethics will prob-
3. See id. at 1173-79.
4. See Barry, And Who Is my Neighbor? 88 YALE L.J. 629, 630-34 (1979) (reviewing
C. FiD, RIGHT AND WRONG (1977)) (paradigm of moral philosophy to succeed cone-




ably be unable to provide a fully satisfactory moral justification for
the liberal democratic state of which our law is* a part.
I believe that Stone's preferred path actually lies along the lines
to moral discourse and that he is really part of the new jurisprudence
of values that we have already seen taking shape in legal and po-
litical theory,5 in constitutional law,6 and in the attacks on law and
economics.7
This new jurisprudence of values has been generated in part by
developments in philosophy but in far greater part by the renewed
self-confidence of lawyers. Chastised by the New Deal and its realist
fellow travelers, lawyers and judges had subsided into subordination
to the demos. Revived by their singular success at exploiting the po-
litical structures of the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, and having become leaders
of an elite, antidemocratic intellectual stratum bent on forcing equal-
ity and other virtues down the throats of the booboisie, lawyers and
judges now commission the academy to tell us that they can correct
the faults of a decadent polyarchy. At their most modest, the new
scholars tell us that lawyers and judges should engage in represen-
tation reinforcing. At their most bumptious, they tell us that if only
lawyers are left free to talk to one another-that is, to litigate-then
their language, properly honed of the professionals, by the profes-
sionals, and for the professionals, will produce more correct ethical
judgments than the rest of us can produce by our Doolittlian jabber.8
Professor Stone's paper is, in its own terms, a call for a more sen-
sitive, self-conscious, and objective examination of legal language
than has generally occurred in the advocacy-based scholarship that has
been assailed by a number of contributors to this symposium. I be-
lieve, however, that the law as language approach that he chooses will,
quite contrary to his own intentions, simply contribute to the hubris
of the jurisprudence-of-values movement in particular and of aca-
demic lawyers in general. For in spite of the assorted pessimisms
5. See, e.g., R. DWOJ.KIN, TAKINO RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG
(1977); M. WALER, Jusr AND UNJUst WARs (1977).
6. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); Fiss, The
Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1979);
Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J.
1063 (1980).
7. See, e.g., Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HAav. L. REv. 537 (1972).
8. It is because they are feeling their own oats, but have become accustomed to the
various law and movements, that academic lawyers wish to impute a similar renewed
self-confidence to moral philosophers who will be towed along as footnotes to the lawyers'
self-asertions of moral grandeur.
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and self-doubts expressed in this symposium by Professors Brest9 and
Tushnet, 10 law and philosophy will be the high road to assertions
of the moral and intellectual, and thus political, superiority of lawyers.
I must conclude that some twenty years hence when the Yale Law
Journal again has the temerity to hold a conference on legal scholar-
ship, we shall have the new Cokes speaking, as Stone already does,
of the artificial reason of the law, and that at the third such con-
ference we shall be more than ready for the new Benthams.
9. See Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1106-09 (1981).
10. See Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205, 1223
(1981).
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